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THE IMPORTANCE OF IDENTIFYING AND ALLOCATING
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITIES IN THE SALE
OR PURCHASE OF ASSETS
I. INTRODUCTION
The potential environmental liabilities that can be exchanged
in the purchase or sale of assets are enormous.' In fact, these liabil-
ities can be so large, they play a major role in the overall structure
of sales transactions.2 For example, the threat of liability based on
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) 3 may cause buyers to structure the
deal as a cash-for-assets acquisition, rather than a stock-for-assets ac-
quisition. Such a decision may prevent the liabilities of the corpo-
rate seller from being transferred to the buyer.4
In addition to influencing the structure of the deal, environ-
mental risks have a tremendous impact on the drafting of specific
contractual provisions included in the purchase agreement. 5 The
precise language incorporated in the provisions relating to environ-
mental liability is of critical importance to both the buyer and the
1. See JOEL S. MosKowrrz, ENVIRONMENTAL L1Aziirl AND REAL PROPERTY
TRANsAcrIONS: LAW AND PRAcricE 4 (1989) (stating that costs associated with Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA) may be as much as $100 million to remediate).
2. See ALLAN J. ToPOL AND REBECCA SNOW, SUPERFtND LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 13.1 (1992) (noting that "potential Superfund liabilities that are exchanged in
some [sale of assets transactions] are large enough relative to the size of the overall
deal that they must be specifically factored into the [terms and structure of the
deal]").
3. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994)) [hereinafter CERCLA]. CERCLA was reauthorized and
substantially amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). SeeJohn C. Cruden, CER-
CLA Overview, SB91 ALI-ABA 1557, 1559 (1997) (explaining amendments made to
CERCLA in 1986 by SARA).
4. See ToPOL & SNOW, supra note 2, at § 13.2 (noting that environmental risks
may cause purchaser to structure acquisition in way that minimizes potential for
environmental liabilities). For a discussion on structuring the deal, see infra notes
30-40 and accompanying text.
5. See Ronald E. Cardwell &Jack D. Todd, Buying, Selling or Closing a Facility: A
Summary of Environmental Issues, 9 S.C. LAw., Sept. - Oct. 1997, at 14, 17 (noting that
certain provisions in purchase agreement "should specify who will absorb the lia-
bility for any discovered contamination with provisions covering due diligence,
cleanup, representations and warranties, indemnification, cost sharing, permit
transfer, facility access and, if appropriate, carve outs.").
(91)
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seller because courts rely significantly on the language of the con-
tract in allocating the environmental liabilities between the parties.6
Thus, the threat of potentially devastating cleanup costs associated
with environmental liability serves as a strong incentive for the par-
ties to draft carefully-worded contract provisions. 7
While the structure and contractual language of the transac-
tion determine the allocation of environmental liabilities between
the parties, the first step in an asset acquisition is to identify any
environmental liabilities that have attached to the property, as well
as any environmental liabilities that have the potential to surface in
the future. s To accomplish this, corporate purchasers must con-
duct a due diligence investigation to ascertain the environmental
risks and liabilities associated with the property.9
This Comment addresses several methods by which a corporate
buyer or seller can minimize its environmental liability. Part II of
this Comment provides an overview of CERCLA liability. 10 Part III
offers a general discussion regarding the significance of the struc-
ture of the transaction.' Part IV discusses environmental due dili-
gence in corporate transactions. 12 Part V explains the contractual
tools available to the buyer and seller to protect against environ-
mental liability.' 3 Part V also analyzes recent CERC[A cases and
examines their impact on both the buyer's and the seller's perspec-
tive. 14 Finally, Part VI summarizes the importance of due diligence,
6. For a further discussion on the importance of contractual language where
CERCLA liability is involved, see infra notes 83-170 and accompanying text.
7. For a discussion of the buyer's and seller's perspectives regarding the draft-
ing of contractual provisions, see infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
8. See David F. Goossen, Contractual Allocation of Environmental Liabilities in Real
Estate Transactions, COLO. LAW., March 1996, at 79 (1996) (noting that "[t]he first
step in allocating environmental liabilities is to identify as many such liabilities as
possible").
9. See Carol R. Boman, Seeking a Standard for Environmental Due Diligence, 797
PLI/CORP 173, 175 (1992) (stating that "severe repercussions" have often resulted
when parties fail to recognize environmental liabilities). For a discussion of due
diligence, see infra notes 41-72 and accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of CERCLA liability, see infra notes 16-29 and accompany-
ing text.
11. For a discussion regarding the structure of the transaction, see infra notes
30-40 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of due diligence, see infra notes 41-72 and accompanying
text.
13. For a discussion of the various contractual drafting mechanisms available
to the buyer and seller, see infra notes 86-170 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion. of how recent cases have impacted the buyer's and
seller's perspective regarding environmentally-related contractual provisions, see
infra notes 128-148 and accompanying text.
[Vol. X: p. 91
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the structure of the deal, and the language of the sale agreement in
allocating environmental liability. 15
II. CERCLA OVERVIEW
Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 to provide a framework for
the prompt cleanup of uncontrolled and abandoned hazardous
waste sites and to ensure that those responsible for the creation of
these sites bear the costs of cleanup. 16 CERCLA liability is triggered
when there is a release or threatened release of hazardous sub-
stances into the environment. 17 Under section 107(a) of CERCLA,
there are four broad categories of potentially responsible parties
(PRPs) that are strictly liable for the costs of hazardous waste
cleanup:' 8 (1) current owners and operators of facilities containing
15. For a summary of the importance of due diligence, structure of the deal
and language of the contract, see infra notes 171-176 and accompanying text.
16. See Cruden, supra note 3, at 1559. One commentator, explaining the his-
tory of CERCLA, stated:
CERCLA was passed in 1980 at the end of the ninety-sixth Congress to
cleanup leaking, inactive or abandoned sites and provide emergency re-
sponse to spills .... The statute was initiated as a response to severe
environmental and health problems at abandoned toxic waste sites such
as Love Canal in New York and Times Beach in Missouri.
Id. (footnote omitted). In explaining the statutory goals of CERCLA, the commen-
tator further stated:
CERCLA was enacted to provide a framework for cleanup of the nation's
worst hazardous waste sites. The primary goal of CERC[A is to protect
and preserve public health and the environment from the effects of re-
leases of hazardous substances to the environment .... Congress in-
tended that those responsible for creation of hazardous conditions bear
the burden of cleaning up those conditions.
Id. (citations omitted).
17. See id. at 1568 (explaining elements of CERCLA liability). One commen-
tator suggests, "[w]hen there is a release or threatened. release of hazardous sub-
stances from a facility that causes the incurrence of response costs, and the costs
are not inconsistent with the National Contingency Plan ("NCP"), all government
costs are recoverable." Id. There are four basic elements of CERCLA liability: (1)
the release or substantial threat of release; (2) of a hazardous substance; (3) from
a vessel or at a facility; and (4) caused by a potentially responsible party (PRP). See
id. at 1568-69. For a discussion of the four categories of PRPs, see infra notes 18-22
and accompanying text. See also CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (listing
categories of PRPs under CERCLA).
18. See CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (explaining categories of PRPs
under CERCLA). Section 107(a) of CERCLA states:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to
the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section -
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at-the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances
were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport
1999]
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hazardous substances; 19 (2) owners and operators of hazardous
waste facilities at the time of the hazardous waste disposal;20 (3)
those who arranged for the disposal or treatment of hazardous sub-
stances; 21 and (4) transporters of the hazardous substances who se-
lected the waste disposal site. 22
In a sale of assets, the categories of CERCLA liability can be
summarized as follows: (1) the seller's liability for the cleanup of its
currently-owned sites; (2) the seller's liability for hazardous waste
for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or pos-
sessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or
incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and
containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or
sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of
a hazardous substance, shall be liable for -
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent
with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other per-
son consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural re-
sources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury,
destruction, or loss resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried
out [consistent with] this title.
Id.
19. See Cruden, supra note 3, at 1569 (defining "current owners and opera-
tors" category of PRPs as those who own property when complaint was filed). "The
plaintiff does not have to prove that disposal of hazardous substances occurred at
the time of ownership or operation .... Ownership status is usually determined
when the plaintiff files complaint." Id. at 1569-70.
20. See id. at 1570 (explaining "[slection 107(a) (2) imposes liability on 'any
person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated'
the facility") (quoting CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)). The government
does not need to prove a release or threat of a release at the time the facility was
owned or operated. See id. Rather, the government only needs to show a release of
hazardous waste occurred during that time. See id.
21. See id. at 1571 (describing "generators" category of PRPs). Section
107(a) (3) imposes liability on anyone who "arranged for disposal or treatment, or
arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous
substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any
facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and
containing such hazardous substances. .... " Id. (quoting CERCLA § 107(a) (3), 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a) (3)). A generator is liable if: (1) it owned hazardous substances;
(2) hazardous substances were shipped to its property; and (3) similar substances
were found on the property. See id.
22. See id. at 1573 (describing "transporters" category of PRPs). "Section
107(a) (4) imposes liability on 'any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous
substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or
sites selected by such person.'" Id. (quoting CERCLA § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a) (4)).
[Vol. X: p. 91
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disposal that occurred during its ownership at sites that it later sold;
and (3) the seller's liability for the cleanup of offsite disposal facili-
ties that were utilized by the seller to dump hazardous waste. 23 To
offset the vast liabilities that CERCILA may impose, there are three
defenses available to a PRP.24 The PRP must show that the release
or threatened release of hazardous waste was caused solely by one
of the following: (1) an act of God;25 (2) an act of war;26 or (3) an
act by a third-party.27 CERCLA's provisions apply retroactively,
therefore, parties cannot avoid liability by proving that the release
or threatened release occurred before the date of CERCLA's enact-
ment or that the release was legal at the time it occurred. 28 A
party's ignorance about the consequences of its actions is no de-
fense in CERCLA cases.2 9
III. STRUCTURING THE TYPE OF TRANSACTION
It is well settled that "when two corporations merge pursuant
to statutory provisions, liabilities become the responsibility of the
23. See ToPOL & SNOW, supra note 2, § 13.1. There are three primary types of
liability under [CERCLA] about which the parties to a transaction concerning the
sale of assets must be aware:
(1) the seller's liability for cleanup of sites which it owns ("current owner
liability"); (2) the seller's continuing liability for disposal that occurred
during its period of ownership at sites which it sold in the past ("past
owner liability"); and (3) the seller's liability for cleanup of offsite waste
disposal facilities to which materials from the seller's facilities were sent
for disposal ("arranger liability"). For real estate transactions, the parties
generally, though not always, focus on the property involved in the trans-
action and the seller's liability for any adverse environmental conditions
existing on the property at the time of closing.
Id.
24. See CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
25. See Cruden, supra note 3, at 1575 (explaining that act of God means "un-
anticipated grave natural disaster or other natural phenomenon of an exceptional,
inevitable, and irresistible character, the effects of which could not have been pre-
vented or avoided by the exercise of due care or foresight").
26. See id. (explaining that act of war "connotes a sudden hostile action," such
as "the sinking of ships belonging to a belligerent nation by submarines of another
nation, or torpedoing a destroyer").
27. See id. (explaining that third-party defense "applies to an act or omission
of a third party (other than an employee or agent of the defendant), or one whose
act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship, existing di-
rectly or indirectly, with the defendant").
28. See Deborah A. Hottel & Michael R. Jeffcoat, Caught in the Web: CERCLA
Owner or Operator Liability of Lenders, Shareholders, Parent Corporations, and Attorneys, 6
S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 161, 163 (1997) (explaining that "CERCLA also applies retroac-
tively even if one's conduct was legal and acceptable at the time") (footnote
omitted).
29. SeeJudith S. Kavanaugh & William L. Earl, CERCLA Investor Liability: "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" Won't Work, 71 FLA. BJ., Aug. 1997, at 56, 57 (1997) ("CERCLA
makes passive ignorance a liability .... ") (footnote omitted).
1999]
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surviving company. '30 When a corporation purchases assets of an-
other corporation, however, it may take precautionary measures to
ensure that it does not inherit previously existing environmental
liabilities under CERCLA or at least to limit the amount of liability
it will inherit.31 To protect itself from liability, a corporation buy-
ing assets must make sure that all of the following instances do not
occur: (1) that its purchase amounts to a de facto merger; 32 (2) that
its purchase is merely a continuation of the seller's business;33 or
(3) that the parties fraudulently tried to avoid liability.34 If any of
the above circumstances occurred, a buyer would face complete
liability.3 5
30. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3d
Cir. 1988) (holding that corporate successor liability doctrine applies to CERCLA
contribution claims); see also Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240,
1245 (6th Cir. 1991) (pointing to Third Circuit's Smith Land decision with approval
and noting that successor is automatically liable if merger occurs); Louisiana-Pa-
cific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that
after merger, successor is liable for predecessor's obligations).
In United States v. Distler, the Third Circuit stated that the purpose of CERCLA
would be frustrated if corporate successor liability was not applicable in claims
involving the statute. See United States v. Distler, 741 F. Supp. 637, 640 (W.D. Ky.
1990). Likewise, in Anspec, the Sixth Circuit used the language of CERCLA to ex-
plain why the doctrine of successor liability applies to CERCLA claims. See Anspec,
922 F.2d at 1240. The court noted that section 107(a) (2) of CERCLA states that a
"person" who owned or operated a facility when hazardous waste disposal took
place is liable. See id. at 1242-43. CERCLA's definition of a "person" includes cor-
porations. See id. (citing CERCLA § 101(21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21)). The court
bolstered its opinion with other sections of the United States Code which refer to
corporation as including "successors and assigns." Id. at 1247. In addition, the
court stated that "Congress would have failed to carry out its purpose of reaching
all such entities if successor corporations were exempted from liability." Id.
31. For a discussion of how a corporation can take precautionary measures to
ensure that environmental liability does not transfer, see infra notes 31-40 and ac-
companying text.
32. For a discussion of a de facto merger, see infra notes 36-40 and accompa-
nying text.
33. For a discussion of the mere continuation of the seller's business, see infra
notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
34. See Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 124, 127
(N.D. Ill. 1993) (discussing "traditional rules of successor liability"), rejected by
United States v. Peirce, NO 83-CV-1 623, 1995 WL 356017 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 1995).
35. See Allied Corp., 812 F. Supp. at 127 (holding that when de facto merger
occurs, successor corporation is liable for any claims against its predecessor). But
see SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 89 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir.
1996) (refusing to apply de facto merger doctrine because if it were applied it
would alter effect of indemnification agreement). In SmithKline Beecham, the reci-
tal of the sale agreement contained a definition of "business" which did not in-
clude the seller's predecessor. See id. at 160. The definition stated:
WHEREAS, Seller manufactures and sells, and conducts research relating
to, a line of animal health products.., and such business is conducted
primarily by Whitmoyer Laboratories, Inc., a Delaware corporation ...
and certain foreign subsidiaries and distributors .... The world wide
[Vol. X: p. 91
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A de facto merger exists when a corporation purchases another
corporation's assets and, although all the statutory merger require-
ments are not met, the transaction has the effect of a merger.3 6 A
operations of such business, together with all the assets relating thereto
* . . are referred to herein as "Business."
Id. Since the definition of business excluded the seller's predecessor, the court
held that the indemnification agreement which used the term could not have in-
cluded the predecessors either. See id.
36. See Allied Corp., 812 F. Supp. at 128 ("'A de facto merger occurs where one
corporation is absorbed by another but without compliance with the statutory re-
quirements for a merger.'") (quoting Arnold Graphics Indus., Inc. v. Independent
Agent Ctr., Inc., 775 F.2d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 1985).
For example, in In re Acushnet River, the Massachusetts district court found
that a de facto merger occurred when, in a purchase agreement, the successor
agreed to perform all the predecessor's contracts and assume its balance sheet
liabilities. See In re Acushnet River, 712 F. Supp. 1010, 1015-16 (D. Mass. 1989).
The only liability excluded in the purchase agreement was that arising from the
predecessor's use or disposal of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). See id. The
successor purchased the predecessor's assets by transferring the stock of the suc-
cessor's parent corporation and by demanding the predecessor to distribute the
stock to its stockholders upon immediate dissolution. See id. See also North Shore
Gas Co. v. Salomon, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 694, 703 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (citing Gould v.
Alter Metal Co., No. 91C20371, 1994 WL 406576, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 1994);
Interstate Power Co. v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 909 F. Supp. 1241, 1278
(N.D. Iowa 1993) (stating that "[w]hen a de facto merger is alleged .... [the]
Court must determine the reality of the transaction") (N.D. Iowa 1993); Savini v.
Kent Mach. Works, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 711, 716 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (citing Knapp v.
North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 1974) (stating that "[a]
merger is found when the seller corporation is absorbed into the purchasing cor-
poration and the seller corporation thereby loses its identity as a separate corpo-
rate entity")).
In determining whether a de facto merger has occurred, courts consider four
factors: (1) whether the transaction is a continuation of the seller's corporation,
(2) whether "there is a continuity of shareholders," (3) whether "the seller ceases
operations, liquidates, and dissolves as soon as legally and practically possible," and
(4) whether "the purchasing corporation assumes the obligation of the seller nec-
essary for uninterrupted continuation of business operations." Louisiana-Pacific
Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260, 1264 (9th Cir. 1990).
In determining whether the first factor exists, the courts consider whether
there is "continuity of management, personnel, physical location, assets, and gen-
eral business operations." 121 A.L.R. Fed. 173, § 2 (1994). It is important to note
that a purchaser may not avoid liability by purchasing assets of another corpora-
tion with stock of a wholly owned subsidiary. See Acushnet, 712 F. Supp. at 1016. In
Acushnet, the district court found that even though the predecessor revived itself
due to the suit brought against it, the fact that it had previously dissolved fulfilled
the third requirement. See id. at 1011. The court also took into account the fact
that the corporation had no assets and no business operations. See id. See also
Widerman v. Mayflower Transit, Inc., No. CIV. A96-2036, 1997 WL 539684, *1, *4-5
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 1997) (using four factors and determining that de facto merger
did not occur because there was no shareholder continuity); Philadelphia Elec.
Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 310 (3d Cir. 1985) (explaining use of four fac-
tors to determine whether de facto merger occurred).
The majority of courts find shareholder continuity to be the most important
factor in determining whether a de facto merger occurred. See Travis v. Harris
Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 1977). See also Widerman, 1997 WL 539684, at *4
(stating that lack of shareholder continuity is "one of the most important factors in
7
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mere continuation of the seller's business occurs when the pur-
chaser carries on the same business as the previous owner. 37 In
making this determination, the court considers whether the iden-
tity of stock, stockholders and corporate employees remain the
same. 38 Finally, a court will find that a transaction is fraudulent if
there is a showing that the parties lacked good faith.39 In essence, a
court will analyze the "true nature of the transaction [to ensure] ...
proving that a de facto merger took place"). No one factor, however, is determina-
tive. See Kleen Laundry & Dry Cleaning v. Total Waste Mgt. Corp., 817 F. Supp.
225, 231 (D.N.H. 1993) (holding that other factors should also be considered);
Acushnet, 712 F. Supp. at 1015 (holding same).
37. See Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 195 B.R. 716, 724
(N.D. Ind. 1996) (explaining that under mere continuation "a corporate successor
is the continuation of the predecessor if only one corporation remains after the
transfer of assets and there is identity of stockholders and directors between the
two corporations").
38. See id. Specifically, the court looks at whether the same employees, super-
visory personnel and facilities are used in the successor company. See id. at 724.
The court also considers whether the successor produces the same product, uses
the same corporate name, holds itself out as a continuation of the predecessor,
and maintains continuity in assets and business operations. See id.
Circuit courts have applied this doctrine differently; some courts apply the test
broadly while other courts apply it narrowly. A narrow application of the test
would not find a purchaser liable unless there was knowledge of the prospective
liability. See United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478, 489-90 (8th
Cir. 1992) (finding no liability under substantial continuity test because of "lack of
notice or ties between the successor and predecessor corporation"). A broader
application of the test would find a purchaser liable despite the lack of knowledge
of environmental liabilities. See Hunt's Generator Committee v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co., 863 F. Supp. 879, 884 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (acknowledging possibility of liability
under CERCLA without notice of possible environmental liabilities); Peirce, 1995
WL 356017, at *3 (holding substantial continuity test applicable regardless of
whether successor has knowledge); Kleen Laundry, 867 F. Supp. at 1144 (holding
substantial continuity test applicable irrespective of lack of knowledge that prede-
cessor undertook activities that created possible CERCLA liabilities).
Other courts have completely rejected the application of the substantial con-
tinuity test for CERCLA claims altogether or for claims against a successor who had
lack of notice concerning the potential CERCLA liability. See Louisiana-Pacific, 909
F.2d at 1265-66 (refraining to apply substantial continuity test when successor did
not have notice of possible CERCLA liabilities and because it did not continue
predecessor's business); Allied Corp., 812 F. Supp. at 129 (holding that substantial
continuity test is inapplicable where successor has no knowledge of possible liabil-
ity); United States v. Atlas Minerals & Chem., Inc., 824 F. Supp. 46, 51 (E.D. Pa.
1993) (holding substantial continuity test inapplicable when successor has no
knowledge or was not responsible for dumping of waste).
In addition, courts also use the mere continuity test to hold a successor liable.
See Ninth Ave., 195 B.R. at 726. This test considers whether "there is identity of
stocks, stockholders, and directors between the asset seller and the purchaser." Id.
39. See Mexico Feed, 980 F.2d at 487 (stating that "[t]he purpose of corporate
successor liability ... is to prevent corporations from evading their liabilities
through changes in ownership when there is a buy out merger"); United States v.
Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 838 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting that "[i]f the
transfer to a new corporation was part of an effort to continue the business of the
former corporation yet avoid its existing or potential state or federal environmen-
[Vol. X: p. 91
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that a company who purchases and continues the business enter-
prise of its predecessor cannot walk away from liability for pollution
when its predecessor is unable to pay its fair share."40
IV. DUE DILIGENCE
While the structure of the deal is an important mechanism for
minimizing the risks of environmental liabilities, it is by no means
the only mechanism. Due diligence is another effective method
that should be used in conjunction with carefully structuring the
deal. 41 Due diligence involves "investigatory activities conducted by
parties in an effort to determine the existence of contamination." 42
The importance of examining the facility to determine environ-
tal liability... [it] should be considered" in determining whether that corporation
will be liable for cleanup costs).
40. Envirobiz, International Env't Info. Network, <http://www.envirobiz.
com/newsdaily/pr09165.htm>.
41. See Martin B. Robins, The Lawyer's Guide to Acquiring a Medium-Sized Busi-
ness, 85 ILL. B.J. 428, 429 (1997) (noting that "[b]uyers who prefer a supposedly
'tightly drafted' acquisition agreement to business-level due diligence are
mistaken").
42. Debra L. Baker, Conducting the Due Diligence Inquiry, 342 PRACTICING L.
INST./REAL 89, 93 (1989) (stating that due diligence may establish that purchaser
"had no reason to know of the contamination and had undertaken all appropriate
inquiries required by CERCLA"); see also MosKowrrz, supra note 1, at 206 (noting
that "due diligence" means that "the transaction will be diligent, rather than casual
[and] . . . adequate, but not excessive").
Environmental due diligence "involves both risk assessment and risk manage-
ment." Rolf R. Von Oppenfeld, Environmental Due Diligence: Risk Assessment and
Management, ARiz. ATr'Y, April 1990, at 24. Its purpose is to minimize or manage
environmental risks so they may be maintained at an appropriate level or cor-
rected all together. See id. at 25. One commentator states:
The greater the client's financial commitment to the proper risk manage-
ment process, the less likely it is that the client later will encounter an
unwelcome environmental "surprise." Regardless of the degree of the cli-
ent's environmental consciousness, however, it is always inevitable that
cost and timing play a factor in the selection of actions to minimize iden-
tified risks.
Id.
A due diligence team should be set up by the purchaser as soon as possible to
start the environmental investigation. See Ram Sundar & Bea Grossman, The Impor-
tance of Due Diligence in Commercial Transactions: Avoiding CERCLA Liability, 7 FoRD-
HAM ENVTL. L.J. 351, 377 (1996). The team should consist of a technical staff
acquainted with the property, legal counsel and an environmental consulting firm.
See id. (footnote omitted).
Unfortunately, potential purchasers practicing due diligence are uncertain as
to the extent of investigation that needs to take place to show that the "appropriate
inquiry" requirement under CERCLA was fulfilled. See id. See also Von Oppenfeld,
supra, at 27 (stating that "[t] he vagueness of the 'all appropriate inquiry' standard
to qualify for the 'innocent landowner' defense led to repeated requests that EPA
further clarify the subject"). In June 1989, Congress attempted to clarify the ap-
propriate inquiry, and in August 1989, the EPA tried to provide further guidance
by describing due diligence, although it did not define the term. See 54 C.F.R.
1999]
9
Healy and Hacker: The Importance of Identifying and Allocating Environmental Liabil
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
100 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
mental liabilities43 is two-fold: (1) the buyer may discover that envi-
ronmental cleanup costs may exceed the value of the property;
44
and (2) the seriousness of the type of risks associated with hazard-
ous waste may be discovered, namely, the degradation of the envi-
ronment and human health. 45 Due diligence benefits both the
buyer and the seller because it allows the buyer to know the nature
and extent of contamination caused by the seller,46 and it gives the
§ 34,235 (1989); see also Von Oppenfeld, supra, at 27 (stating that EPA's "guidance
is not very helpful"). EPA categorized landowners into four different classes:
First, there is a landowner who can make a "thoroughly convincing dem-
onstration" so that the government agrees there is a "very high
probability" that the innocent landowner defense could be established at
trial. In such a case, EPA only will require that the landowner provide
access and a commitment to due care during the EPA-directed response ac-
tion. Second, there is a landowner who can demonstrate that it is "likely"
that the innocent landowner defense can be established, although the
demonstration is not "thoroughly convincing." That second-level land-
owner must negotiate a level of cash consideration to be provided to EPA, along
with access and due care assurances. Third, there is a landowner who cannot
demonstrate eligibility for a de minimis landowner settlement, but who
may be eligible for a de minimis settlement using the same criteria that
apply to generators and other defendants. This third category of settle-
ment depends upon the amount and toxicity of the hazardous substances contrib-
uted by the settler to the facility, and is discussed in a separate guidance
document. The fourth category of landowner is one who simply does not
qualify for any form of de minimis settlement.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
43. See Sundar & Grossman, supra note 42, at 363 (stating that "allocation
between the parties of the risks and responsibilities associated with environmental
liability is an issue that must be addressed in every commercial transaction involv-
ing the transfer of real estate"). See also MosKowrrz, supra note 1, at 205 (stating
that transactional risks in environmental context are best minimized through due
diligence and careful contract drafting); Von Oppenfeld, supra note 42, at 24 (stat-
ing that "[t]he key to avoiding liability or other losses is the exercise of what is
appropriately known as environmental due diligence"); Boman, supra note 9, at
175 ("Those who have failed to recognize the potential impact of these laws and to
provide for this impact when structuring an acquisition or financing transactions
have often experienced severe repercussions."). Due diligence should be per-
formed in all types of acquisitions regardless of the present facility's operations.
See Kenneth H. Mack, Environmental Due Diligence, Site Audits and Dealing with Con-
sultants, 373 PRACTICING L. INST./REAL 473, 476-77 (1991) (discussing need for due
diligence in various contexts).
44. See MOSKOWITZ, supra note 1, at 4 (stating that "individual sites may cost
more than $100 million to remediate").
45. See MosKowrrz, supra note 1, at 205 (describing dangerous risks involved
with hazardous waste disposal).
46. See Cardwell & Todd, supra note 5, at 17 (noting that information from
due diligence allows buyer "to make an informed decision about whether to
purchase the [asset], what price to offer, the anticipated cost of bringing the [as-
set] into environmental compliance, the expected cost of cleaning up the [asset]
and potential claims by third parties").
[Vol. X: p. 91
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seller a basis for denying environmental liability caused by the
buyer after closing.47
Due diligence requires examination of the property, the prop-
erty's air emissions, waste management and the extent of discharge
into waters, including wastewater, surface waters, groundwater, sew-
ers and storm water. 48 In addition, tanks and site conditions should
be examined in the due diligence investigation. 49 This process en-
ables parties to remediate environmental liabilities if they so
choose, 50 but most importantly, it gives both parties better knowl-
edge concerning the risks involved in the transaction. 51 Later, the
parties can allocate these risks contractually with both parties being
fully informed as to the nature and extent of environmental liabil-
ity.5 2 Due diligence investigations not only enable the buyer and
47. See id. at 15 (explaining that due diligence allows a seller to learn about
"the facility's raw materials, processing, goods, compliance equipment, wastes gen-
erated, waste disposal, environmental permits, and soil, surface water and ground
water conditions").
48. See Manko, Gold & Katcher, Environmental Due Diligence in Real Estate
Transactions [pamphlet]. Frequently, due diligence is completed in phases. See
Baker, supra note 42, at 97. A Phase I investigation involves less examination than
a Phase II investigation. See id. A Phase I investigation is used to determine the
existence of hazardous substances. See Mack, supra note 43, at 477 (stating that
Phase I investigation "normally means an historical and current document review
... and at least one site inspection (which may include minimal sampling)").
If hazardous waste is found, then a more complete investigation will take place
in the form of a Phase II investigation. See Baker, supra note 42, at 97 (explaining
that "[d]epending upon the results of an initial investigation, a Phase II or more
full-blown investigation... may be instituted"); see also Mack, supra note 43, at 478
(stating that Phase II investigation "entails some (usually non-intrusive) sampling
of areas of possible environmental concern identified in Phase I"). If a more com-
plex situation occurs then a Phase III or IV investigation may be warranted. See
Von Oppenfeld, supra note 42, at 27 (stating that Phase III or V investigations
.generally involve further definition or resolutions of previously identified
problems and are oriented toward management of identified risks"); see also Mack,
supra note 43, at 478 (noting that Phase III audits "normally involve extensive sam-
pling of surface and subsurface of soils (on a grid basis) and of groundwater,
through the use of monitoring wells" and "[b]ecause of the intrusive nature of
such sampling, it nearly always entails some remediation activity").
49. See Baker, supra note 42, at 98-100 (listing general areas of inquiry to be
investigated).
50. See Sundar & Grossman, supra note 42, at 378 (stating that "many of the
problems that are identified in the course of the due diligence investigation can be
managed and solved in creative ways").
51. See MosKowrrz, supra note 1, at 206 (stating that "allocation will then be
made with reference to a body of knowledge and subject to informed judgment");
see also Mack, supra note 43, at 480-81 (noting that "many due diligence investiga-
tions which disclose some areas of environmental concern will result in either [a
future] allocation of expense for remediating presently unquantifiable risks, or
some payment or indemnity by the seller which ... may span a period of some
years").
52. See Mack, supra note 43, at 480 (discussing allocation of risks by parties
through contract). Due diligence, however, will not necessarily discover all envi-
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seller to more accurately establish the property to be acquired,53
but also help to "establish an 'innocent purchaser defense'[54]
ronmental risks because many of the risks are "hidden by time, nature, or both."
Id.
53. See Robins, supra note 41, at 429 (stating that due diligence provides "the
best opportunity for the parties to see whether they are getting what they are bar-
gaining for").
54. See Mack, supra note 43, at 476 (discussing elements and availability of
"innocent landowner defense"). Because CERCLA holds current owners and oper-
ators liable for contaminated facilities, "[m] ere ownership, whether legal or equita-
ble, of a facility ... may be sufficient to create liability." Von Oppenfeld, supra
note 42, at 25. One defense against CERCLA liability that is available to an owner
of a hazardous waste cite is the third party defense, which requires an owner to
prove two elements:
[1] that he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance
concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of such hazard-
ous substance, in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and [2]
that he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such
third party and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such
acts or omissions.
CERCLA § 107(b) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3)(1994). This third party defense
completely discharges a party from liability. See Sundar & Grossman, supra note 42,
at 355 (discussing impact of third party defense). This defense, however, is limited
to circumstances where there is no "contractual relationship." M & M Realty Co. v.
Eberton Terminal Corp., 977 F. Supp. 683, 686 (M.D. Pa. 1997). Congress ad-
dressed this problem by adding "a definition of 'contractual relationship' in the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) to create what
has come to be know [sic] as the 'innocent landowner' defense." Id.
In many cases this defense is not available because the contamination on
property was transferred by a land contract, deed or transfer instrument. See Von
Oppenfeld, supra note 42, at 25 (stating that this defense is generally unavailable if
"the act or omission of the third party occurred in connection with 'a contractual
relationship existing directly or indirectly with' the defendant") (footnote omit-
ted); see also Baker, supra note 42, at 94 (stating that party is prevented from assert-
ing innocent landowner defense if "contamination existed upon property acquired
pursuant to a land contract, deed or transfer instrument except if certain limited
circumstances . . .can be established") (citation omitted).
Where there are contractual relations the owner must prove that "[a]t the
time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant did not know and had no
reason to know that any hazardous substance which is the subject of the release or
threatened release was disposed of on, in or at the facility." CERCLA
§ 101(35)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i)(1994). To prove this defense, the
owner must show that he undertook "all appropriate inquiy into the previous owner-
ship and uses of the property consistent with good commercial or customary prac-
tice in an effort to minimize liability." Id. § 101 (35) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (B)
(emphasis added). To determine whether "all appropriate inquiry" has taken
place, a court will consider four factors which the defendant must prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence:
1. Another party was the "sole cause" of the release of hazardous sub-
stances and the damages caused thereby;
2. The purchasing landowner did not actually know of the presence of
the hazardous substance at the time of the acquisition;
3. The purchasing landowner undertook appropriate inquiry at time of
acquisition, in order to minimize its liability; and
4. The purchasing landowner exercised due care once the hazardous
substance was discovered.
12
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol10/iss1/4
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITIES
or qualify the owner for a settlement under CERCLA." 55
Due diligence also requires investigation into the site's history
of operations. 56 Some environmental consultants believe that in-
house facility records provide enough information about the facil-
ity's operational history, while other consultants suggest that a more
comprehensive investigation is necessary. 57 If in-house records are
inadequate or an environmental consultant suggests a more com-
prehensive investigation, a title search may be a useful device to
discover prior ownership. 58 A title search, however, "will only note
the chain of ownership and will not necessarily identify the actual
operators and actual usages of the property."59 Nevertheless, the
title search may uncover deeds with survey maps attached that high-
light structures no longer in existence. 60
M & M Realty, 977 F. Supp. at 687 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(b)(3), 9601(35) (A));
see also Westfarm Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v. Washington Suburban Sanitary
Comm'n, 66 F.3d 669, 682 (4th Cir. 1995); Hemingway Transp., Inc. v. Kahn, 993
F.2d 915, 932 (1st Cir. 1993).
55. Von Oppenfeld, supra note 44, at 27. CERCLA allows settlements with de
minimis landowners when the defendant:
(i) is the owner of the real property on or in which the facility is
located;
(ii) did not conduct or permit the generation, transportation, storage,
treatment, or disposal of any hazardous substance at the facility, and
(iii) did not contribute to the release or threat of release of hazardous
substance at the facility through any action or omission.
CERCLA § 122(g) (1) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g) (1) (B) (1994). Thus, if an owner
does not qualify for the "innocent landowner defense," he may be able to satisfy
the requirements for de minimis settlement. See Von Oppenfeld, supra note 44, at
27. To fulfill the requirements for de minimis settlement, the defendant must
show evidence proving lack of actual or constructive knowledge of hazardous waste
disposal previously on property. See id.
56. See MOSKOWITZ, supra note 1, at 207 (discussing process of obtaining site
history); see also Mack, supra note 43, at 485 (noting difficulty of gathering histori-
cal data).
57. See MosKowrrz, supra note 1, at 207 (noting that in-house records usually
contain enough information for initial background investigation). In-house
records tend to contain more information where there has been no change of
ownership or no change in the business operations. See id. at 207-08. If there have
been frequent changes in ownership and/or changes in business operations it is
difficult to predict the records' thoroughness. See id.
58. See id. at 208 (stating that title search "may provide beneficial starting
point if no prior ownership or operation details can be established").
59. Id. at 209. A title search may not expose the fact that a property was
leased to another company using hazardous waste. See id.
60. See Mack, supra note 43, at 485-86 (commenting that survey maps and ae-
rial photographs may contain structures that operated in past and could cause
future environmental problems); see also Baker, supa note 42, at 98 (noting that
use of "historical air photos, USGS topographical maps and other historical maps
and surveys to determine prior uses and visible abnormalities" may indicate pres-
ent or potential environmental liabilities). In addition, a title search may find
deeds that contain documents attached to them which were previously filed by the
1999]
13
Healy and Hacker: The Importance of Identifying and Allocating Environmental Liabil
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
104 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOuRNAL
The extent of the examination into the facility's past opera-
tions depends on the age of the facility, the location of the facility
and the type of operations the facility maintains. 61 EPA records, as
well as state and local board of health records, can also be helpful
because they may show the facility's previous environmental
problems in more detail than in-house records. 62 Additionally, en-
vironmental permits may provide an indication of the type of envi-
ronmental factors associated with the property.63  Records
concerning the location, storage and usage of hazardous waste at
the facility should also be examined. 64
Physical inspection of the facility is often helpful in under-
standing the equipment and/or chemicals that have been used at
the site.65 The inspection should start with a meeting of relevant
prior owner. See Mack, supra note 43, at 486. These documents, such as a grant of
an easement, may help an investigator analyze potential problems. See id. In deter-
mining prior uses, it may also be helpful to interview former employees. See Baker,
supra note 42, at 98.
61. See MOSKOWITZ, supra note 1, at 208 (asserting that site specific factors may
determine extent of investigation into property's history). Although age, location
and operations may guide the focus of investigations, a purchaser should always
examine a description of past operations and investigate the presence of past envi-
ronmental problems. See id. Nevertheless, the extent of due diligence depends on
"the time available for investigation before the transaction closes, the amount of
money that the client is willing to expend, and the nature of environmental
problems themselves." Mack, supra note 43, at 479.
62. See id. (stating that federal, state and local records may prove beneficial in
investigation). The investigation should include an examination of the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Information System
(CERCLIS), which is an EPA database containing potentially hazardous waste sites.
See Sundar & Grossman, supra note 42, at 356 (describing advantages of examining
CERCLIS as part of investigation); see also Baker, supra note 42, at 98 (suggesting
that one should review CERCLIS to find out if surrounding properties are listed in
its database).
63. See MOSKOWlTZ, supra note 1, at 210 (stating that environmental permits
provide helpful information about environmental condition of site or asset).
Knowledge of the environmental factors connected with the facility will help deter-
mine whether certain areas of the facility's operations should be viewed in a more
thorough manner. See id.
64. See id. at 211 (stating that "[e]ach operation should be reviewed so that
the handling of raw materials can be traced from delivery to storage to transport
into the process area and through production"). One must also examine points at
which hazardous waste is emitted during operations. See id.
65. See MOSKOWITZ, supra note 1, at 209 (noting advantages of physical inspec-
tion as opposed to solely reviewing papers concerning facility). This commentator
noted that paper review may misrepresent the extent of potential environmental
liability:
For example, a facility may be described to the investor as being engaged
in the evaporation of sea water for the extraction, packaging, and distri-
bution of dried magnesium and other sea salts. This gives no indication
of extensive chemical usage, hazardous waste generation or related con-
cerns. Initially, this superficial review may entice the potential investor
who perceives a low environmental concern associated with the opera-
[Vol. X: p. 91
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employees who can explain the site's operations, followed by a
physical examination noting the site location, 66 conditions of both
the inside67 and outside of the facility,68 and the land surrounding
the facility.
69
Due diligence must take place before the sale agreement is
drafted, otherwise the parties will lack the requisite knowledge to
draft a contract that properly allocates environmental liabilities. 70
Due diligence may enable the buyer to use the innocent landowner
defense or qualify the buyer for a settlement under CERCLA.71 In
addition, due diligence heightens the parties' awareness of current
and potential environmental conditions associated with the prop-
erty, and therefore allows the option of remediation before closing
the sale. 72
tion. Unfortunately, the written process description also gives no indica-
tion that ancillary equipment and installations related to the main
process consist of the storage, pumping, piping, and general usage of
hundreds of thousands of gallons of fuel to pump and heat millions of
gallons of sea water.
Id.
66. See MosKowiTz, supra note 1, at 209. The setting of the site "plays an im-
portant role in evaluating the potential liability posed by any environmental im-
pairment that site operations may have caused." Id. The examiner should make
note of whether the facility is located in a rural, suburban or industrial area. See id.
Further, the proximity to water bodies and other environmentally sensitive areas
should be documented. See id.
67. See id. Inside the facility, the examination should follow the same route as
the facilities operations. See id. Because "It] here can be many possible migration
pathways, transport media, and receptors," an investigator should determine the
actual path of the migrants. Id. In addition, "[c] areful attention must be given to
areas whereby products or wastes containing hazardous constituents are potentially
released and transported to receptors." Id. Before the inside investigation begins
and during its investigation, a review of the blueprints may help to identify "sani-
tary or storm sewers, leach fields, dry wells, process lines, sumps, floor drains,
building vents, and transformers." Id.
68. See id. (explaining that outside facility, examination should focus on physi-
cal condition and purpose of "piping, conduits, vent pipes, and related items").
69. See id. (noting that evaluation of land surrounding facility should include
areas of land that are infrequently used). Surrounding facilities should be ob-
served for contaminates which may have traveled to neighboring facilities. See id.
70. For a discussion of the benefit of due diligence, see supra notes 43-47 and
accompanying text.
71. For a discussion of CERCLA defenses, see supra notes 54-55 and accompa-
nying text.
72. See Sundar & Grossman, supra note 42, at 385 (stating that seller can facili-
tate sale of property "by providing in purchase agreement, that the seller would
remediate the site post-closing").
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V. DRAFTING CONSIDERATIONS:
THE BUYER'S AND SELLER'S PERSPECTIVES
After the environmental liabilities are identified through due
diligence, the parties can begin drafting the contractual provisions
that will allocate those liabilities. There are many contractual tools
available to shift the risks of environmental liabilities in CERCLA-
related transactions.73 The most essential tools are representations,
warranties clauses,74 and indemnification provisions. 75 Other pro-
tective provisions include: (1) releases; 76 (2) "as is" clauses; 77 (3)
property access provisions;78 and (4) pre-conditions. 79
Since courts scrutinize the actual words of the contract provi-
sions, careful drafting of those provisions is critical.80 Courts gener-
ally will enforce negotiated contract terms, provided that at least
one party is able to fund the waste cleanup.8' If the indemnifying
party is unable to fund the cleanup, the indemnified party will be
required to meet the costs of the cleanup, regardless of the contrac-
tual terms.8 2
Both the buyer's and the seller's objective in drafting CERCLA-
related contractual provisions is to minimize their respective poten-
tial environmental liabilities.83 Specifically, the buyer's goal is to
73. See Manko, supra note 48, at 15.
There are many types of contractual provisions that serve to shift or as-
sign risks of environmental liabilities. Parties use representations, cove-
nants, indemnifications, releases, as well as various mechanisms to
enforce those obligations, such as escrows, hold backs, set-offs, and vari-
ous limitations on the obligations, such as limitations in time, baskets,
caps, sharing arrangements, etc. There are in fact as many options as
there are creative lawyers and business persons.
Id.
74. For a discussion of representations and warranties clauses, see infra notes
86-105 and accompanying text.
75. For a discussion of indemnification provisions, see infra notes 106-48 and
accompanying text.
76. For a discussion of release clauses, see infra notes 153-56 and accompany-
ing text.
77. For a discussion of "as is" clauses, see infra notes 157-62 and accompany-
ing text.
78. For a discussion of property access provisions, see infra note 163 and ac-
companying text.
79. For a discussion of pre-condition clauses, see infra notes 164-66 and ac-
companying text.
80. See Manko [pamphlet], supra note 48, at 15 (noting that "both the envi-
ronmental provisions and the defined terms" must be carefully crafted).
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See Cardwell & Todd, supra note 5, at 15 (explaining objectives of buyers
and sellers).
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eliminate or indemnify itself against environmental liabilities from
hazardous waste releases that may have occurred before the
purchase. 84 The seller's goal is to eliminate its potential responsi-
bility for future cleanup costs resulting from hazardous waste re-
leases that occurred prior to the sale.8 5 This section examines the
drafting tools that may be used by the purchaser and seller to mini-
mize their respective liabilities.
A. Representations and Warranties
The "representations and warranties" made by the seller are
significant to both the buyer and the seller.8 6 The representations
and warranties section of the purchase agreement confirms the
existence of material conditions which the buyer was aware of and
subsequently relied on when it entered into the transaction.87
84. See TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 2, at § 13.3. Two commentators state:
"[t]he purchaser's objective in negotiating for the inclusion of specific con-
tract[ual] provisions is to eliminate or to obtain an indemnity against its potential
liability for all activities that occurred prior to the time it made its acquisition and
that may have caused or contributed to adverse environmental conditions." Id.
85. See id. at § 13.4. One author explained:
The seller's objective in negotiating specific contractual provisions relat-
ing to environmental liabilities is clear: it seeks to minimize any future
obligation it might have to pay the cost of remedying damages resulting
from its pre-closing activities. Any liabilities that it retains may operate to
reduce the seller's purchase price, and in the case of Superfund liabili-
ties, that reduction is likely to be significant.
Id.
86. See id. at § 13.3. One author explained:
Of critical concern to the parties are the seller's "representations and
warranties" that are found in the purchase agreement, in which the seller
states that certain facts relating to the company or assets being sold are
true as of the date of the agreement and will be true as of the date of the
closing of the transaction.
Id.
87. See Robins, supra note 41, at 432 (explaining purpose of representations
and warranties section). Robins stated:
Numerous disclosure schedules are typically attached to the agreement to
spell out pertinent details - i.e. lease facilities, bank accounts, owned
real estate, employee benefit plans, customer bad debts, pending tax au-
dits, lawsuits or administrative proceedings, etc. In addition, this section
usually addresses each party's authority to proceed with the transaction,
including required third party consents and internal obligations such as
stockholder and board-of-directors approval.
Id. See also Manko, supra note 48, at 15-16 (explaining goal of representations).
The goal of representations can be explained as follows:
[The purposes of representations are] to identify and describe the envi-
ronmental problems, demonstrate due diligence, and focus the seller's
attention on environmental matters as well as to provide a measure
against which the information gained during due diligence may be com-
pared and the basis for a remedy if the representations and warranties are
not true. Representations generally cover past and present site condi-
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The buyer has a strong incentive to influence the structure of
the representations and warranties section. 8 Unless the buyer ob-
tains an indemnification provision from the seller,89 the representa-
tions and warranties section will serve as the buyer's "primary
source of protection." 90 Most importantly, if any representations or
tions and features, site activities, compliance with law, off-site known and
contingent liabilities, and all other relevant information.
Id. See also Lilly Indus., Inc. v. Health-Chem Corp., 974 F. Supp. 702, 711 (S.D. Ind.
1997) (explaining significance of warranties in CERCLA-related sales agreements).
The Lilly Industries court stated:
Warranties backed by promises of indemnification are important ele-
ments of business transactions .... These contract terms give the buyer
of a property or business some protection against the risks that the prop-
erty or business has some unknown defect, danger, or contingent liability.
They can also save the buyer the expense of a thorough and independent
evaluation of a particular aspect of the transaction. A warranty is "an as-
surance by one party to a contract of the existence of a fact upon which
the other party may rely. It is intended precisely to relieve the promisee
of any duty to ascertain the fact for himself; it amounts to a promise to
indemnify the promisee for any loss if the fact warranted proves untrue,
for obviously the promisor cannot control what is already in the past."
Id. (citing Shambaugh v. Lindsay, 445 N.E.2d 124, 127 (Ind. App. 1983) (quoting
Metropolitan Coal Co. v. Howard, 155 F.2d 780, 784 (2d Cir. 1946))).
88. See TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 2, at § 13.3 (explaining that "there are
three major reasons for seeking to obtain from the seller a combination of broad,
unqualified representations and certain detailed, specific representations pertain-
ing to particular environmental matters of concern"). These commentators have
noted the following reasons the buyer may seek to influence the seller when draft-
ing the representations and warranties section:
First, in the event that any of the environmental representations or war-
ranties proves to be false and results in financial injury to the purchaser,
not only might the purchaser have a private cause of action against the
seller under [CERCLA], but he also may sue the seller for damages due
to the breach of contract. Second, many transactional documents con-
tain indemnities specifically requiring the seller to reimburse, or to pay in
the first instance, the purchaser's expenses that are incurred as a result of
the seller's false representations or warranties. Thus, the purchaser
might be able to avoid even having to pay the initial outlay for costs in-
curred due to the false representations. Third, highly conscientious, re-
sponsible sellers who have carefully monitored their operations may be
unwilling to give blanket representations and warranties, but the excep-
tions that they carve out usually help the buyer more accurately to iden-
tify and to assess the areas of true environmental concern.
Id. See Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994 (D.N.J. 1988) (plain-
tiff brought CERCLA suit against defendant to pay cleanup costs of dumping that
occurred during time defendant owned site); see Nunn v. Chemical Waste Manage-
ment, Inc., 27 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1655 (D. Kan. 1988) (seller represented that
company was in compliance with all applicable laws and court found that site was
leaking at time of sale; therefore, purchase agreement had been breached).
89. For a discussion of indemnification provisions, see infra notes 106-48 and
accompanying text.
90. See Alan S. Levine, Negotiating Environmental Provisions in Real Estate Trans-
action, C266 ALI-ABA 421, 423 (February 11, 1988) (explaining importance of rep-
resentations and warranties for buyer). One author noted: "Properly drafted,
[representations and warranties] can protect the purchaser from known problems
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warranties prove to be false, the buyer may be able to bring a CER-
CIA cause of action or a breach of contract suit against the seller. 91
The buyer's goal in influencing the representations and war-
ranties provisions of the purchase agreement is to have the seller
represent and warrant the environmental facts and conditions that
the buyer has relied upon in structuring its offer.92 Ideally, the
buyer of a business would like the representations section to in-
clude the following: (1) detailed and absolute representations that
are unlimited by materiality or knowledge;93 (2) representations
that apply equally to all properties and companies currently or pre-
viously owned;94 and (3) representations that apply throughout the
historical life of the business property.95
The seller's perspective on the representations and warranties
section is the opposite of the buyer's. 96 For the seller, the represen-
tations and warranties section is a significant area of potential liabil-
ity.9 7 The seller, therefore, must be extremely careful in drafting its
representations and warranties section so it is not vulnerable to fu-
currently existing as well as unknown complications which may arise in the future."
Id.
91. See ToPOL & SNOW, supra note 2, at § 13.3 (discussing CERCLA implica-
tions where representations and warranties made by seller are proven false).
92. See id. (explaining that "[a]s an opening position in the negotiations, the
purchaser typically asks the seller to represent and to warrant to the accuracy of
any environmental facts that purchaser has assumed or relied upon in making its
offer of acquisition") One commentator stated:
In this regard, some purchasers go so far as to seek representations and
warranties that there are no facts or conditions relating to the site (i) that
might give rise to future liability in connection with environmental
problems or (ii) that would restrict the purchaser from operating the
company or assets after the closing in the manner that it intends.
Id.
93. See Manko, supra note 48, at 16 (explaining various concerns of buyer in
drafting representations clause). One commentator, in describing what the buyer
wanted included in the representations clause, stated:
The buyer wants detailed, absolute representations, unlimited by knowl-
edge or materiality and applying equally to properties now or previously
owned, operated, or leased by the seller, and to any and all companies
now or previously owned or operated by the seller. The buyer also wants
the representations to apply throughout the history of the business or
property, whether or not the seller owned or controlled the business or
property during the entire time.
Id.
94. See id. (discussing buyer's desire for representations to cover entire prop-
erty or business).
95. See id. at 31-32 (listing examples of environmental representations and
warranties provision drafted by seller for buyer of real property).
96. See id. (noting that, with respect to representations and warranties, "seller
usually takes a very different view [than the purchaser]").
97. See Levine, supra note 90, at 423 (discussing liability seller may encounter
as result of representations and warranties section).
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ture CERCLA liabilities.98 The seller's ideal representations section
would include: (1) representations that are limited to its knowl-
edge;99 (2) representations regarding only material issues;100 (3)
representations regarding issues that would not be discovered in an
audit; 10 1 and (4) representations limited to the time during which
the seller owned the property.10 2 The final result of a negotiated
98. See id. at 424 (noting that "seller must exercise great care in determining
the scope, breadth and content of representations and warranties which may be
given to a prospective purchaser"). One commentator states:
If, for example, the seller warrants that "there is no environmental con-
tamination existing on the property," and environmental contamination
is later discovered, the seller may become liable for the full cost of any
clean up. Such consequences can spell disaster for the innocent and un-
witting seller. As a result, it is imperative that the seller attempt to negoti-
ate narrowly tailored representations and warranties covering only those
matters within the actual knowledge of the seller.
Id.
99. See Manko, supra note 48, at 16 (explaining seller's concerns regarding
representations and warranties). Manko stated:
The seller will want to represent only to its knowledge (and then limit the
individual or corporate level whose knowledge must be considered), only
as to material issues, to information that would not be uncovered in an
audit (or, alternatively, to be allowed to incorporate the audit results in
its response), and only to the time during which it owned and/or oper-
ated the business or real property. In addition, the seller will want the
right to schedule exceptions to the statements in the representations ....
The seller may be concerned that if accuracy of the representations is a
condition to closing, too expansive representations amount to a pur-
chaser option for the buyer. For example, a flat representation to full
compliance with all environmental laws is almost never possible - few
companies have not missed a filing deadline or had the wrong individual
sign a form or had a minor exceedence of a permit limit at some time in
their existence. If a buyer could back out of the transaction based on an
undisclosed exception to such a representation, this might be tanta-
mount to an option.
Id.
100. See id. (noting that representations regarding only material issues
reduces chances of liability).
101. See id. (discussing significance of audit and how issues that would not be
discovered in audit are of particular concern to seller).
102. See id. The following is an example of an environmental representations
and warranties provision drafted for the seller of real property:
Environmental Matters: To the knowledge of Seller, no reportable quan-
tities of hazardous substances as defined in Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, as amended
("CERCLA") have been released on the Property by Seller. Seller has not
received from any federal, state, or local environmental regulatory entity
any written request for information, notice of claim, demand letter, or
other notification that in connection with the Property, Seller is or may
be potentially responsible with respect to any investigation or cleanup of
hazardous substance releases at the Property. No notification of release
of hazardous substances pursuant to any state or local environmental law,
regulation, or ordinance has been filed by Seller as to the property.
See id. at 34.
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representations and warranties provision is clearly a "compromise,
with some flat representations, some to knowledge, some limited by
materiality, and most with appropriate schedules." 10 3
Finally, while both the buyer and seller each will attempt to
draft the representations and warranties provision of the purchase
agreement to its own advantage, no representation or warranty will
fully protect a buyer from CERCLA liability if hazardous waste is
later found on the property.10 4 In order to adequately protect
themselves, it is essential that buyers perform environmental due
diligence prior to drafting the representations and warranties
provision.105
B. Indemnification Provisions
While representations and warranties provide the groundwork
for allocating environmental liability between the buyer and seller,
it is the indemnification provisions that generally become the focus
103. Id. at 16 (explaining compromises made by parties when negotiating
content of representations and warranties clauses).
Sometimes the same topic (e.g., the presence of underground tanks) may
be handled differently, at present and past facilities or from times prior to
this seller's ownership of the business or real property. In addition,
where there is no materiality, the condition to closing may be that the
representations must be true in all material respects or that environmen-
tal liabilities will not exceed a certain dollar amount.
Id.
104. See Levine, supra note 90, at 424 (discussing buyer's CERCLA liability
despite attempt to eliminate or reduce liability through representations and war-
ranties provisions).
105. See id. (noting that "a purchaser will not be adequately protected unless,
in addition to the representations and warranties .... the purchaser also conducts
a sufficient environmental inspection of the property"). Commentators have
noted:
[I]n order to draft language that adequately protects both parties, the
lawyers must have information about the nature and condition of the as-
sets that are to change hands, the disposal practices of the seller, and the
nature and condition of off-site disposal locations and former facilities
used by the seller. On rare occasions, courts have allowed a party to re-
scind land sales contracts on mutual mistake grounds because neither
party was aware of nearby waste dumps. More frequently, however, the
parties are forced to assume the risks of their mistakes. Thus it is impor-
tant to obtain site information and, in order to do so, it is generally neces-
sary to hire competent lawyers and technical consultants who can
conduct a thorough investigation centered on the potential Superfund
liabilities of the seller.
TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 2, § 13.1. (footnotes omitted). For a discussion of the
environmental inspection which should occur prior to the date of closing, see
supra notes 42-69 and accompanying text.
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of negotiations among the parties. 106 Indemnification clauses "re-
flect a reasonable allocation of risks and duties" between parties to
a transaction. 10 7 Parties may use an indemnification clause to shift
financial liability attached to a certain asset in the event of a future
CERCLA cleanup. 08
Courts assert, however, that "[n] otwithstanding [the] existence
of indemnification agreements, all [PRPs] under CERCLA are
jointly and severally liable to government for cleanup and closure
costs."'1 9 Thus, all parties are liable to the government for cleanup
costs, yet one party can seek indemnification from another party if
a previous contractual agreement exists."i 0 Usually, if parties draft
an indemnity clause where all or some financial liability is shifted, it
will be reflected in the price of the asset or property."'
A court may enforce indemnification agreements pursuant to
section 107(e) (1) of CERCLA. 112 While this section of the Act pre-
vents the "transfer" of CERCLA liability from the seller to the buyer,
it allows the seller to completely indemnify the buyer, or to share
CERCLA financial liability through contractual agreement." 3 Sec-
tion 107(e) (1) of CERCLA states:
106. See TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 2, at § 13.3 (explaining that "[d]ue to
the significance of environmental liabilities, [indemnification provisions] fre-
quently become the focus of negotiations").
107. Hayes v. Mobil Oil Corp., 736 F. Supp. 387, 392 (D. Mass. 1990) (holding
that indemnification provision defeats plaintiff s claim for contribution and noting
that indemnification clauses should not be construed against drafter).
108. See CERCLA § 107(e), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e) (1994). See also Fisher Dev.
Co. v. Boise Cascade Corp., 37 F.3d 104, 107 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that parties
may allocate among themselves costs of cleaning up hazardous waste site under
CERCLA).
109. William B. Johnson, Annotation, Liability of Parent or Successor Corporation
Shareholders in Action Pursuant to Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act, 121 A.L.R. FED. 173 (1994).
110. See Olin Corp. v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 807 F. Supp. 1133,
1138 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting that if government was prevented from seeking re-
covery cost, CERCLA's goals would be contravened); see also Mobay Corp. v. Allied-
Signal, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 345, 355 (D.N.J. 1991) (stating that "parties remain liable
for response costs in a government-initiated cleanup").
111. See City of Toledo v. Beazer East, Inc., 103 F.3d 128, n.5 (6th Cir. 1996)
(stating "the 'polluter-seller essentially pays' for its pollution by accepting an ar-
guably lower purchase price in exchange for releases from liability").
112. See Purolator Prods. Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 124, 130
(W.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that parties have right to bring action to enforce their
contractual arrangements); see also Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F.
Supp. 994, 1000 (D.N.J. 1988) (noting that CERCLA's liability provisions do not
abolish parties' contractual rights).
113. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 89 F.3d 154, 158
(3d Cir. 1996) (recognizing that parties may "lawfully allocate CERCLA response
costs among themselves while remaining jointly and severally liable to the govern-
ment for the entire cleanup"); see also Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Minstar, Inc., 41
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No indemnification, hold harmless, or similar agreement
or conveyance shall be effective to transfer from the owner
or operator of any vessel or facility or from any person
who may be liable for a release or threat of release under
this section, to any other person the liability imposed
under this section. Nothing in this subsection shall bar any
agreement to insure, hold harmless, or indemnify a party to such
agreement for any liability under this section." 4
Additionally, section 107(e) (2) of CERCLA states that "[n]othing
in [CERCLA] ... shall bar a cause of action that an owner or opera-
tor or any other person subject to liability under this section, or a
guarantor, has or would have, by reason of subrogation or other-
wise against a person."' 1 5 Courts have interpreted the above provi-
sions to mean that a party faced with a CERCLA claim has a right to
bring an action seeking indemnification from another party and
F.3d 341, 342 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that CERCLA "does not outlaw indemnifica-
tion agreements, but merely precludes efforts to divest a responsible party of his
liability"); John S. Boyd Co., Inc. v. Boston Gas Co., 992 F.2d 401, 405 (1st Cir.
1993) (stating that "[t ]wo or more parties, however, can allocate ultimate responsi-
bility among themselves by contract"); Commander Oil Corp. v. Advance Food
Serv. Equip., 991 F.2d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that CERCLA preserves right
to enter into indemnification agreements); United States v. Hardage, 985 F.2d
1427, 1433-36 (10th Cir. 1993) (explaining that parties have right to obtain indem-
nification); Teleflex Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Prods. Co., Inc., 961 F. Supp. 368,
372 (D. Conn. 1996) (stating that "private parties may contractually allocate among
themselves any loss they may suffer by the imposition of CERCLA liability"); Inter-
state Power, 909 F. Supp. at 1264 (asserting that CERCLA does not preclude parties
from transferring liability); Purolator Prods. Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 772 F.
Supp. 124, 129 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that "liable parties can contractually shift
responsibility for their response costs among each other, but they may not thereby
escape their underlying liability to the Government or another third party");
Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994, 1000 (D.N.J. 1988) (stating
"CERCLA expressly preserves the right of private parties to contractually transfer
to or release another from the financial responsibility arising out of CERCLA lia-
bility"); Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 669 F. Supp.
1285, 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (asserting that CERCLA "authorizes indemnity
agreements").
CERCLA's legislative history also bolsters the proposition that the Act allows
parties to shift financial responsibility through indemnification agreements. See
H.R. Rep. No. 96-1016, Pt. I, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119.
Congress intended CERCLA to provide quick financial recovery for environmental
cleanups. See id. Since a distribution of financial liability between a buyer and
seller would not hinder Congress' goal of remediating environmentally contami-
nated areas, there is no reason to prohibit indemnification agreements. See Purola-
tor, 772 F. Supp. at 129-30. Therefore, CERCLA's focus is remediation, not
retribution. See Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248, 253 (2d Cir. 1996).
114. CERCLA § 107(e) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e) (1) (1994) (emphasis added).
115. Id. § 107(e) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e) (2).
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the court will enforce it, provided the agreement meets certain re-
quirements under state law.116
Although federal law allows a buyer and seller to include an
indemnification clause in a sale agreement, 117 state law will be used
to settle any contractual disputes. 118 If a court finds under state law
that the intention of the parties was to allocate CERCLA liability as
expressed in its indemnification agreement, indemnification will be
enforced.119
There are two situations where courts have held that indemni-
fication agreements release the buyer from liability and therefore
leave the seller responsible for cleanup costs: (1) where the terms
of the indemnification clause are broad, so as to include all liabili-
116. See Purolator, 772 F. Supp. at 130 (stating that "[s]ection 107(e) (1) will
not be interpreted to abrogate such contractual agreements"); Nieko v. Emro
Mktg. Co., 769 F. Supp. 973, 989 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (asserting that Congress' inten-
tion in enacting CERCLA was not to invalidate private agreements), affid, 973 F.2d
1296 (6th Cir. 1992); Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1573
(E.D. Pa. 1988) (stating that "[a] person that is liable under the terms of [CER-
CLA] may by agreement be held harmless or indemnified by another party");
Southland Corp., 696 F. Supp. at 1000 (asserting that CERCLA does not invalidate
contractual arrangements); Chemical Waste, 669 F. Supp. at 1293 (asserting that
"CERCLA's liability provisions do not abrogate the parties' contractual rights").
117. See SmithKline Beecham, 89 F.3d at 158 (applying federal law to determine
that parties may allocate CERC[A cleanup costs).
118. See id. The court, in applying New Jersey law, found that as long as the
result would not frustrate the purposes of CERCLA, the majority of courts use state
contract law to ascertain the parties' intentions and interpret contractual lan-
guage. See id.; see also Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 59 F.3d 400, 404-05 (3d
Cir. 1995) (applying New York law); Beazer East Inc. v. Mead Corp., 34 F.3d 206,
215 (3d Cir. 1994) (applying Alabama law); Olin Corp. v. Consolidated Aluminum,
807 F. Supp. 1133, 1139 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (applying NewYork law);John S. Boyd Co.,
992 F.2d at 406 (applying Massachusetts law); United States v. Hardage, 985 F.2d
1427, 1433 (10th Cir. 1993) (applying Oklahoma law); Jones-Hamilton Co. v.
Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 973 F.2d 688, 692-93 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying
Oklahoma law).
Recently, the Eastern District Court of Michigan decided whether the law of
the state of incorporation or the state with the greatest interest in the lawsuit
should govern when a case involves an alleged successor corporation. See Chrysler
Corp. v. Ford Motor Co., 972 F. Supp. 1097, 1101 (E.D. Mich. 1997). In Chrysler
Corp., the district court noted that matters of internal corporate governance are
generally governed by the state of incorporation, while matters outside the corpo-
ration are governed by "more general choice of law rules." Id. at 1102. The court
held that the case concerned matters outside the corporation because CERCLA
lawsuits affect a "large number of actors, including the federal and state govern-
ment and a variety of [PRPs]." Id. at 1103. Thus, the court concluded, in accord-
ance with modern choice of law rules, that the law of the state where the relevant
injury and conduct causing the injury took place is the governing law. See id.
119. See Teleflex Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Prods. Co., Inc., 961 F. Supp. 368,
372 (D. Conn. 1996) (stating that "although parties may, under federal law, con-
tractually allocate CERCLA liability, the breadth of clauses purporting to do so,
and the intent of the parties, will be interpreted under state law").
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ties; 120 or, (2) where the terms of the indemnification clause are
specific, so as to explicitly include CERCLA liability. 121 In either
situation, courts hold that the intent to transfer environmental lia-
bility must be unequivocal in order for the transfer to take place. 122
Courts, therefore, generally enforce such indemnification clauses
only when the provisions of the contract "evince a clear and unmis-
takable intent of the parties to do so."123
Courts look to the plain language of the contract to determine
the parties' intent.124 If the plain language is unambiguous, courts
120. For a discussion of the courts' interpretation of broadly written indemni-
fication provisions, see infra notes 128-45 and accompanying text.
121. See Gene A. Lucero et al., CERCLA Rights and Liabilities, SC18 ALI-ABA 1,
121 (1997) (citing Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 345 (D.N.J.
1991)). One commentator has suggested that "to interpret a contract as transfer-
ring CERCLA liability, the agreement must at least mention that one party is as-
suming environmental-type liabilities" or contain a broad relief provision that
waives liabilities of any type. Id.
122. See Olin Corp. v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 5 F.3d 10, 15 (2d Cir.
1993). The court must find "clear and unmistakable intent" before it will enforce
an indemnification agreement. See id.; see also Hemingway Transp. Inc. v. Kahn,
126 B.R. 650, 653 (D. Mass. 1991) (holding that indemnification clause clearly
transfers CERCLA liability because of "inclusive and unequivocal language demon-
strat[ing] a clear intent to transfer all liability") (emphasis added).
123. Lion Oil Co., Inc. v. Tosco Corp., 90 F.3d 268, 270 (8th Cir. 1996) (ex-
plaining requirements for enforceable CERCLA indemnification clause); see also
Ekotek Site PRP Comm. v. Self, 948 F. Supp. 994, 1002 (D. Utah 1996) (holding
that indemnity provision, which provided that purchaser did not assume any liabil-
ities other than those explicitly stated, does not in itself give rise to inference that
purchaser assumed CERCLA liabilities of seller).
124. See Lion Oi4 90 F.3d at 268, 270 (holding that plain language of contract
was "clear, unequivocal and unambiguous" in its allocation of CERCLA liability).
Lion Oil purchased an oil refinery from Tosco in 1985. See id. at 269. Section
2.8(d) of the purchase agreement included the following provision:
Tosco hereby agrees to indemnify and hold harmless [Lion Oil] ... for
any and all (1) civil, legal and administrative costs; (2) fines and penal-
ties; (3) response, remedial and cleanup costs, and (4) other costs or lia-
bility arising from any sudden or non-sudden harm to the environment
or public health resulting from actions of Tosco prior to the Closing Date
.... Costs which result from harm inflicted or discovered after the Clos-
ing Date, but which are the consequence of actions taken by Tosco prior
to this date, shall be indemnified by Tosco.
The cleanup costs which Tosco agrees to indemnify include, but are not
limited to, all studies, site assessments, and any and all other efforts taken
to determine the extent of harm to public health or the environment
and/or to identify possible remedial alternatives that could ameliorate
such harm. Cleanup costs include costs incurred directly by [Lion Oil] or
by employees, agents, or contractors hired by [Lion Oil].
Under this clause, [Lion Oil] shall be indemnified for all liability and
costs incurred under common law (federal and state) or existing local,
state or federal statutes that protect public health and/or the environ-
ment, including but not limited to, the following federal statutes: the
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will not consider extrinsic evidence.' 25 Although an indemnity
clause may prove to be a "bad business decision" by the seller, a
court will not factor that into its analysis where the contract lan-
guage is unambiguous. 126 If the contract is ambiguous, however,
courts will infer that indemnification was not intended. 2
7
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9601-9657[ ] ....
The liability of Tosco pursuant to this Section 2.8(d) shall expire at the
end of four (4) years after Date of Closing and shall not exceed a total of
$1,000,000 in the aggregate ....
Id. In 1986, the following release amendment was made to the purchase agree-
ment in exchange for Tosco's agreement to accept a discounted prepayment by
Lion Oil of Lion Oil's remaining purchase price obligation:
Lion [Oil] hereby extinguishes, discharges, releases and abandons any
and all rights and claims against Tosco which it has or may have pursuant
to the provisions of subsection 2.8(d) of the [purchase agreement], or to
the extent any such claims would be covered by the provisions of said
subsection 2.8(d) even though also potentially covered within the general
indemnification provisions of subsection 2.8(a) .... whether now existing
or arising in the future, at common law, or in equity, or created by any
rule of law, regulatory order, statute or otherwise, and whether known or
unknown.
Id.
125. See id. at 270 (explaining that extrinsic evidence is not to be admitted
when contractual language is unambiguous). The court concluded:
The [purchase agreement] contained a broad indemnity provision that
encompassed environmental harm caused by Tosco. Indeed, Section
2.8(d) [supra note 124], specifically referred to CERCLA. The [release
amendment] absolves Tosco from all obligations under Section 2.8(d).
In these circumstances, the [purchase agreement and release amend-
ment] unequivocally combine to allocate to Lion Oil any potential liabil-
ity arising under CERCLA. The parol evidence rule prohibits the
admission of extrinsic evidence to alter these otherwise ambiguous
contracts.
Id.
126. Id. at 271 ("The fact that hindsight may have proven the [purchase
agreement] to be a bad business decision for Lion Oil does not negate its valid-
ity."). The court noted that "this is not a case in which an unsophisticated party
hastily entered into a contract. It is clear that Lion Oil was aware that the purchase
of an oil refinery involved a risk of significant potential environmental liability, as
exhibited in the detailed provisions of the [purchase agreement]." Id. at 270-71.
127. See International Paper Co. v. GAF Corp., No. 95-CV-0322, 1995 WL
760641 at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 1995) (concluding that if parties want to include
an indemnification provision for CERCLA liabilities, such provision must be ex-
plicit). The court held that the following indemnification provision did not in-
demnify the purchaser for CERCLA liabilities:
Purchaser shall indemnify and save harmless Seller from and against: ...
any liabilities or obligations or alleged liabilities or obligations of the Pur-
chaser arising from the operation of the Graphic Arts Business by Pur-
chaser subsequent to the Closing Date, or any of the liabilities specifically
assumed by Purchaser pursuant to this Agreement or to which any of the
real property to be transferred hereunder is subject as set forth in Exhibit
2 ....
Id. The court concluded:
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For example, in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Rohm & Haas,128
the Third Circuit held that an indemnification agreement was
broad enough to cover CERC[A cleanup costs, even though the
parties could not have contemplated such costs in structuring the
agreement because CERCLA was not enacted at that time. 129 The
agreement stated that the buyer would be indemnified by the seller
for " [aill material relating to the conduct of the Business prior to the
First Closing Date" and "[all losses, liabilities, damages or deficien-
cies to Seller resulting from the operation of the Business by the
Buyer after the First Closing Date." 13 0 This language was inter-
preted by the court to allocate to the seller "all present and future
liabilities," including CERCLA cleanup costs.' 3 1
Likewise, in American National Can Co. v. Kerr Glass Manufactur-
ing Corp.,132 the Northern District Court of Illinois, applying Illinois
Stripped to its essential core, this agreement was an arms-length contract
between two sophisticated business entities in which no clear and unmis-
takable intent was evinced regarding CERCLA. In light of the enormous
liability that may arise under CERCLA, which was in effect at the time the
parties entered into this agreement, the Court believes that specific and
detailed terms would have been included if release and indemnification was
indeed intended by the parties. Because of CERCLA's potential signifi-
cance, the lack of reference to the Act leads the Court to believe that the
parties did not reach a "meeting of the minds" on this issue. Although
this analysis is not essential to the decision at hand, it does serve to cor-
roborate the correctness of the Court's previous decision.
Id. (emphasis added). For a discussion of the courts' interpretation of ambiguous
language in a contract, see infra notes 141-145 and accompanying text.
128. 89 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 1996). In SmithKline, Whitmoyer Laboratories, Inc.
(Old Whitmoyer) was bought by W-L, Inc., a Rohm and Haas (R & H) wholly
owned subsidiary. See id. at 156-57. This purchase was in exchange for shares of R
& H stock. See id. at 157. Old Whitmoyer dissolved and W-L took the name of
Whitmoyer Laboratories (New Whitmoyer) and continued to operate the same
business. See id. Later, R & H sold assets to SmithKline Beecham Corp. (SKB)
which included all of the New Whitmoyer stock. See id.
129. See id. at 160.
130. Id. at 159. Relying on Olin Corp. v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., the
court, applying New Jersey law, held that the language in the indemnification
agreement was "sufficiently broad" to encompass CERCLA cleanup costs. Id.
131. See id. at 160.
132. No. 89-C-0168, 1990 WL 125368 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 1990). In American
National the plaintiff (purchaser) sought contribution from the defendant (seller)
for CERCLA cleanup cost of a glass manufacturing plant purchased in 1983. See id.
at *1. The defendant, in turn, sought partial indemnification, pursuant to a 1969
sale agreement with a third party (previous owner). See id. Applying Pennsylvania
law, the Northern District Court of Illinois stated that "[a] n indemnification clause
is valid if (i) the clause regulates only private conduct between parties with some
degree of parity in bargaining power, (ii) both parties were aware of the clause and
(iii) enforcement would not violate public policy." Id. at *2 (citing Lackie v. Niag-
ara Mach. & Tool Works, 559 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Pa. 1983)). Thus, the district
court held the third party liable for the CERCLA cleanup cost attributed to actions
during his ownership. See id.
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law, held that an indemnification agreement included a CERCLA
claim, because the parties used broad language.15 3 The relevant
provision provided that the buyer would be indemnified for "any
claim of any kind or nature whatsoever with respect to the business car-
ried on by [the buyer] arising out of facts or events occurring prior
to the Closing Time."1 34 The district court held that the language
expressed that the parties intended for the buyer to be indemnified
for both anticipated and unanticipated claims.' 3 5 Consequently, the
district court disregarded the argument that the seller was not lia-
ble because CERCLA had not been enacted at the time of the
agreement and therefore could not have been contemplated.' 36
Similarly, in Purolator Products Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc.,l3 7 the
Western District Court of New York, applying New York law, held
that the contractual language was broad enough to include CER-
CLA liability.'3 8 Specifically, the relevant provision stated that the
133. See id. Courts have held that in order to bring a CERCIA action, there
must be:
an "agreement which shows that the parties intended to resolve all their
disputes involving any type of claim including CERCLA claims, even if the
agreement is framed in general terms and does not specifically refer to
CERCLA or to environmental liability. However, if the agreement ap-
pears to be limited to specific disputes or particular types of liability, CER-
CIA liability will be excluded unless the agreement contains a clear,
unambiguous reference to such liability."
Interstate Power Co. v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 909 F. Supp. 1241, 1265
(N.D. Iowa 1993) (quoting Purolator Prods. Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 772 F.
Supp. 124, 130 (W.D.N.Y. 1991)); see also M & M Realty Co. v. Eberton Terminal
Corp., 977 F. Supp. 683, 688 (M.D. Pa. 1997) (stating that "the majority of federal
courts ... conclude that there can be no allocation of CERCLA liability without
explicit language of indemnification, clearly manifesting the parties' intent to
transfer environmental liability"); Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 801 F. Supp.
1309, 1317-18 (D.N.J. 1992) (holding that indemnification agreement must either
transfer all liability or expressly mention environmental liabilities); Mobay Corp. v.
Allied-Signal, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 345, 357 (D.N.J. 1991) (stating that some "clear
transfer or release of future 'CERCLA-like' liabilities" is required) (quoting South-
land Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994, 1002 (D.N.J. 1988)).
134. American National 1990 WL 125368, at *2.
135. See id. at *4. The court found that the contractual language created a
distinction between environmental liability caused by the seller's past actions and
the purchaser's future actions, whereby each party is liable for its own contribu-
tion. See id.
136. See id. It was asserted that the sale agreement in 1969 could not have
contemplated CERCLA liability because the statute was enacted over a decade af-
ter the agreement was drafted. See id. Nevertheless, the court rejected this argu-
ment because the language in the contract implied that unanticipated claims
would be indemnified if they resulted from the seller's practices. See id.
137. 772 F. Supp. 124 (W.D.N.Y. 1991).
138. See id. In Purolator, Purolator sought ajudgment declaring that it was not
liable to indemnify Allied which acquired one of Purolator's wholly-owned subsidi-
aries. See id. at 126-27. The court held that the sale agreement entered into by
Purolator's subsidiary and Allied was broad enough to encompass CERCLA liabil-
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buyer "agrees to satisfy all liabilities and obligations of Bendix secured
and unsecured (whether accrued, absolute, contingent or otherwise)
relating or arising out of the Assets (which are transferred hereby
subject to such liabilities and obligations)."139 The court found that
this language showed no intent by the parties to limit the buyer's
liability. 140
Courts have held that ambiguous language regarding CERCLA
liability in indemnification clauses is not enforceable. 41 Courts
have found ambiguity when the terms of the agreement are not
clear "from the four comers of the agreement."142 For example, in
Scott Galvanizing, Inc. v. Northwaste Enviroservices, Inc.,143 the
Supreme Court of Washington, applying Washington law, refused
to enforce an indemnification agreement between a generator and
a waste hauler because the parties' intent was unclear.144 The in-
demnification provision stated that the hauler would indemnify the
generator for:
ity. See id. at 131-32. The court noted, however, that a purchaser may seek contri-
bution from the previous owner to the extent that the purchaser did not agree to
indemnify the previous owner. See id. at 128. Thus, the purchaser could seek the
amount equivalent to the cost attributed by the previous owner. See id. Because
only some assets were transferred to Purolator, the court had to determine "what
assets were transferred to [Purolator] ... and on the degree to which those costs
arise out of the assets." Id. at 132.
139. Id. at 133 (emphasis added). See also Taracorp, Inc. v. NL Indus. Inc., 73
F.3d 738, 741 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding provision stating indemnification "for all
obligations, responsibilities, and liabilities, costs, and expenses.., related to envi-
ronmental hazards associated with [the] facility," transferred CERCIA liability to
seller). In making its determination, the Purolator court held that a prior agree-
ment between the purchaser and seller also alluded to indemnification against any
CERCLA claims because it covered "all liabilities arising out of or connected with
the assets and businesses of [the purchaser] .. . transferred to [the buyer]." Puro-
lator, 772 F. Supp. at 128. Also, the court pointed out that there was evidence that
both the seller and purchaser knew that the site contained hazardous waste. See id.
at 135.
140. See id. at 131 (stating that "[t]here is no suggestion in this language, or
anywhere else in the agreement, that the effect of this clause was limited to particu-
lar claims or types of liability").
141. See North Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 694 (N.D. Ill.
1997) (noting that extrinsic ambiguity may also be grounds for holding indemnifi-
cation agreement invalid), affd in part, rev'd in part, No. 97-2485, 1998 WL 446572
(7th Cir. Aug. 5, 1998).
142. City of Toledo v. Beazer East, Inc., No. 96-3500, 1996 WL 683505, at *2
(6th Cir. Nov. 22, 1996); see also Wells v. American Elec. Power Co., 548 N.E.2d 995
(Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (stating that contract language should evince parties' true
intent).
143. 844 P.2d 428 (Wash. 1993).
144. See id. at 434 (finding summary judgment inappropriate because parties'
intent could not be discerned).
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any and all liability, damages, costs, claims, demands and
expenses (including reasonable attorney's fees), including
but not limited to pollution or other damages, as and to
the extent that such liability, damages.., are caused by or
in any manner result from the performance by [the waste
hauler] of its services under this agreement or arise out of
the negligence of [the waste hauler] .... 145
Defining terms within a contract helps eliminate ambiguity.
For example, in City of Toledo v. Beazer East, Inc., the Sixth Circuit
held that there was no indemnification agreement because the
word "discharge" was undefined and therefore the parties' intent
was unclear.146 In addition, defining the length of the indemnifica-
tion period is essential.147 Courts have held that in order for in-
demnification provisions to survive the closing date, the parties
must clearly state such an intention.148
C. Other Protective Provisions
The other types of environmental provisions that parties to a
sale of assets should consider incorporating into their sales agree-
145. Id. at 430; see also 55 Motor Ave. Co. v. Liberty Indus. Finishing Corp., 38
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1336 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that "as is" clause in lease is
too ambiguous to warrant indemnification for CERCLA liabilities).
146. Beazer, No. 96-3500, 1996 WL 683505 at *1. The agreement stated:
Upon the terms and subject to the conditions set forth herein, Seller shall
assign to Buyer and Buyer shall assume at the Closing by an appropriate
instrument of assignment and assumption . . . all debts, obligations, du-
ties, undertakings, agreements, contracts and liabilities of Seller of any
kind or nature whatever, whether direct or indirect, absolute or contin-
gent, which consist of, arise out of, or in any way relate to, any of the
following... : Any law, statute .... or commitment whether arising prior
to, on or subsequent to the Closing and relating to... the discharge at or
by the Toledo Coke Plant of ipdustrial products, waste or other materials
into the air, streams, lakes, rivers or otherwise .... provided however, that
Buyer shall not assume any liability for, or obligation to pay, any fine or
penalty arising out of Seller's operation of the Toledo Coke Plant prior to
Closing.
Id. at *1 (emphasis added). The court held that it was unclear whether the word
"discharge" includes discharge onto the land, or whether it included only dis-
charge into the air and water. See id. As a result, the court remanded the case and
stated that the parties could introduce extrinsic evidence. See id.
147. See GERARD A. CARON, STRUCTURING THE TRANSACTION TO ALLOCATE ENVI-
RONMENTAL LIABILITY IN ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF REAL ESTATE TRANsACTIONS,
243, 249-50 (1995) (explaining importance of defining indemnification provi-
sion's survival period).
148. See French v. Isham, 801 F. Supp. 913, 916-17 (D.R.I. 1992) (holding that
because warranty clause did not define survival period, warranty did not survive
closing).
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ment include: (1) releases; 149 (2) "as is" clauses; 150 (3) access re-
quirements;151 and (4) pre-conditions. a52
A release is typically used in conjunction with an indemnifica-
tion clause to waive the right of a party to seek damages arising out
of environmental conditions of the property.153 For example, if a
seller indemnifies a buyer for pre-closing environmental liabilities,
and the buyer indemnifies the seller for post-closing environmental
liabilities, then it is customary for the seller to release the buyer
from pre-closing environmental liability claims and for the buyer to
release the seller from post-closing environmental liability
claims.1 54 Courts generally construe release clauses strictly.' 55
Therefore, parties should be careful to draft releases in a manner
that clearly shows their intent.156
Another contractual allocation tool is the "as is" clause,
although this is not a means by which a party can avoid CERCLA
149. For a discussion of release clauses, see infra notes 153-56 and accompany-
ing text.
150. For a discussion of "as is" clauses, see infra notes 157-62 and accompany-
ing text.
151. For a discussion of access requirement clauses, see infra note 163 and
accompanying text.
152. For a discussion of pre-condition clauses, see infra notes 164-66 and ac-
companying text.
153. See Goosen, supra note 8, at 81 (explaining that release clauses waive
party's right to seek damages arising out of environmental conditions at site).
154. See Manko, supra note 48, at 19 (noting customs of buyers and sellers
when using releases). Commentators have noted that:
In addition to an indemnification, it is often helpful to have a specific
release of liabilities under particular laws for obligations based on occur-
rences during particular periods of time. For example, if the seller is to
indemnify buyer for all pre-closing environmental liabilities and the
buyer is to indemnify seller for all post-closing environmental liabilities,
then it makes sense for the seller to release the buyer from claims for the
post-closing period and for the buyer to release seller from the post-clos-
ing period.
Id.
155. See Goosen, supra note 8, at 81 (explaining that releases should make
parties' intentions clear because "release clauses are often strictly construed").
156. See id. (noting that "[c]ourts have found ... that the intent to transfer
CERCLA liability must be explicit or clearly intended as evidenced by the language
of the clause"); see also Olin Corp. v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 5 F.3d 10, 15
(2d Cir. 1993) (holding that language of release provision evidenced parties' clear
intent). In Olin, the release provision which was found to evidence the parties'
clear intent stated:
In consideration of the payment on this date by Olin to Conalco of
$3,700,000 . . . Conalco hereby releases and settles all claims of any na-
ture which Conalco now has or hereafter could have against Olin . ..
whether or not previously asserted, under or arising out of the Purchase
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liability altogether. 157 The "as is" clause is essentially the opposite
of the representations and warranties clause because it shifts the
risk of all environmental liabilities to the buyer.1 58 The power of
the "as is" clause has been weakened significantly in recent years for
a number of reasons. First, courts have begun to recognize a duty
to disclose environmental conditions in real estate transactions, and
legislatures have passed mandatory disclosure laws. 159 Second, "as
is" clauses may not be used to relieve a seller of CERCLA liability
because CERCLA holds former owners liable for cleanup costs re-
gardless of culpability. 160 "As is" clauses, therefore, should not be
157. See Wiegmann & Rose Int'l Corp. v. NL Indus., 735 F. Supp. 957 (N.D.
Cal. 1990) (holding that CERCLA precludes party from avoiding liability by relying
on "as is" clause); International Clinical Lab., Inc. v. Stevens, 710 F. Supp. 466, 470
(E.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating that "the 'as is' clause of the contract cannot be construed
to bar the present [CERCLA] action"); Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc. v. JFD
Elecs. Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1229, 1231 (E.D.N.C. 1988) (stating that "as is" clause
does not act to shift liability from one party to another).
158. See Goosen, supra note 8, at 81 (noting that "as is" clause "places the risk
of loss for known or unknown environmental conditions entirely on the purchas-
ing party"); see also International Paper Co. v. GAF Corp., No. 95-CV-0322, 1995
WL 760641, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (explaining when "as is" clause is enforceable).
In International Paper, the New York District Court cited the following example of
an enforceable "as is" clause:
Seller makes no representations or warranties as to the value, operating
condition, state of maintenance and repair or usefulness in the operation
of the Graphic Arts Business or of the Assets described in Sections
2(a) (1), 2(a) (2), 2(a) (3), or 2(a) (4) and the premises which are the sub-
ject of the leasehold interest described in Exhibit 16, and the Purchaser
hereby agrees to accept the above enumerated Assets and premises in the
condition they exist on the Closing Date. Subject to section 9(h), Pur-
chaser hereby agrees to accept all the Assets "AS IS" as they exist at the
Closing Date and expressly waives any claim whatsoever for any defect
relating to the physical condition of the Assets.
Id.
159. See Goosen, supra note 8, at 81 (explaining declining effectiveness of "as
is" clauses). One commentator states:
Although once commonplace, the use and effectiveness of as is clauses is
declining. First, the doctrine of caveat emptor has been eroded in real
estate transactions by the enactment of mandatory disclosure laws and
the recognition by courts of a duty to disclose known environmental con-
ditions. While caveat emptor generally still may apply in commercial real
estate transactions, the usefulness of the clauses is severely limited in
states with mandatory disclosure laws.
Id. (footnote omitted).
160. See id. (noting that "an as-is clause may not relieve a seller of direct
cleanup liability, such as liability under CERCLA, which holds former owners and
operators strictly, jointly and severally liable for cleanup costs regardless of culpa-
bility") (footnotes omitted); see also Douglas A. Henderson, Environmental Liability
and the Law of Contracts, 50 Bus. LAw. 183, 215-18 (November, 1994) (explaining
why "as is" clauses are prohibited from eliminating CERCLA claims). One com-
mentator states:
For CERLCA liability to be transferred among PRPs, several courts re-
quire that the contractual provision specifically mention CERCLA or
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relied upon to allocate environmental risks.161 Rather, in order to
maximize the effectiveness of an "as is" clause, it should be used in
conjunction with indemnity provisions and releases. 162
Several other environmental protective provisions are available
to the parties of a sale of assets. The buyer, for instance, may con-
sider including in the sale agreement a requirement that the seller
allow the buyer access to the property prior to the closing so that
the buyer can perform an environmental inquiry. 163 Other protec-
tive provisions can be used to establish pre-conditions which, if not
met at closing, result in allowing one of the parties to rescind the
agreement.1 64 For example, the buyer should establish a pre-condi-
tion that allows it to terminate the agreement if it is dissatisfied with
the results from its environmental investigation. 165 The buyer
should also establish as a pre-condition that the seller obtain all of
the consents as required by state and federal environmental laws.166
CERCL-type liabilities. In Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., for exam-
ple, Southland sought contribution under section 113(f) for the nearly
$1 million spent in cleaning up a site purchased from Ashland in 1978.
Applying NewJersey law, the NewJersey district court found that, stand-
ing alone, the "as is" provision barred only breach of contract claims
based on indemnity and failure to remove hazardous waste. CERCLA
contribution claims were not defeated by the "as is" provision. It has
been on this basis that most courts have held that "as is" and similar con-
tractual provisions do not absolve a seller from CERCLA liability.
Henderson, supra at 215-16 (footnotes omitted).
161. See Wiegmann & Rose, 735 F. Supp. 957 (holding that CERCLA precludes
party from avoiding liability despite existence of "as is" clause). For a discussion of
the reasons why "as is" clauses should not be relied upon, see supra notes 157-60
and accompanying text.
162. See Goosen, supra note 8, at 81 (explaining that by including indemnities
and releases with "as is" clauses, party can more clearly show its intent to include
environmental conditions).
163. See TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 2, at § 13.3 (explaining other types of
environmental provisions that parties should consider). Two commentators state:
[T] he agreement should require that the seller, upon reasonable request,
allow the buyer and its agents access to the site prior to the closing of the
transaction for the purpose of making any environmental inquiries that
the buyer deems appropriate to conduct. Such an access provision, ac-
companied by a clause allowing the purchaser to rescind the agreement if
contamination is discovered, is especially important for transactions in
which the environmental investigation has not been completed by the
time that the purchase agreement is signed.
Id.
164. See id. (explaining that pre-conditions can be utilized as protective envi-
ronmental provision).
165. See id. (noting that "buyer should negotiate closing conditions that per-
mit it to back out of the deal if it is not satisfied with the final results of any envi-
ronmental investigation").
166. See id. ("The buyer should also insist as a pre-condition that it be relieved
of its obligation to complete the acquisition if the seller has not obtained all of the
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Another important protective provision involves the determi-
nation of which party will be responsible for the physical cleanup
that may be required after closing. 167 While this provision does not
establish which party will be responsible for funding the cleanup,
the delegation of the physical cleanup is an important issue to both
parties.168 The buyer, for example, would like to manage the
cleanup so that the work can be scheduled in a manner that does
not interfere with the ongoing operation of the business. 169 The
seller, on the other hand, might insist on managing the cleanup to
keep the costs down and to ensure that the buyer's newly acquired
assets do not receive any unneeded enhancements.
170
VI. CONCLUSION
There are significant environmental risks associated with the
purchase or sale of assets.171 Often, the parties' ability to identify
and allocate these risks can make the difference between closing
and not closing such a transaction. 172 It is imperative that the
buyer conduct a thorough due diligence investigation of the asset
being acquired in order to identify properly the environmental
risks associated with the asset.173 Once the potential risks have
necessary approvals or consents, including those required by state environmental
laws.").
167. See id.
168. See TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 2, at § 13.3 (explaining that provision
which states which party will conduct cleanup is "separate from the question of
which party will pay the costs of the cleanup").
169. See id. (explaining reasons why purchasers may want responsibility of
conducting cleanup). Commentators have noted several advantages to the buyer if
the buyer is the party that performs the cleanup:
Regardless of who will pay the bills, buyers generally wish to take responsi-
bility for managing the remedial work so that they can schedule and or-
ganize the cleanup in a manner that least interferes with the ongoing
operations at the site. Also, if the buyer is obligated to bear the costs of
the remedial work, it may choose to manage the project in order to keep
the costs down. On the other hand, for large cleanups, supervision of a
remedial program can be so time-consuming that buyers actually prefer
that the seller take charge.
Id.
170. See id. (explaining that "if the seller is obligated to pay for the cleanup, it
is likely to insist on maintaining control of the work so that it can minimize costs
and ensure that the work is not being performed in a way that simply enhances the
current owner's property value").
171. See Goosen, supra note 8, at 79 (noting that it has been estimated that
more than 500,000 properties nationwide have evidence of contamination, and
costs of cleaning up these properties will exceed $650 billion).
172. For a discussion of the importance of identifying the risks of a transac-
tion, see supra note 2 and accompanying text.
173. For a discussion of due diligence, see supra notes 41-72 and accompany-
ing text.
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been identified, both the buyer and seller must consider the several
drafting mechanisms available to allocate environmental liabili-
ties. 174 The contractual language used in the representations and
warranties clauses and indemnification provisions is critical, as
courts rely significantly on the actual words used by the parties to
determine environmental liability allocation. 175 In addition, the
parties should consider several other protective provisions which,
when combined with well-drafted representations and warranties
clauses and indemnification provisions, will provide added protec-
tion from environmental liabilities. 176
Colleen E. Healy and Mark S. Hacker
174. For a discussion of the contractual drafting mechanisms available to allo-
cate environmental risks in the sale or purchase of an asset, see supra notes 73-127
& 149-70 and accompanying text.
175. For a discussion of how courts construe environmental protective provi-
sions, see supra notes 128-48 and accompanying text.
176. For a discussion of other protective provisions available to the purchaser
and seller, see supra notes 149-70 and accompanying text.
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